To what extent has eight years of participation in the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (G20) strengthened the infl uence of developing countries in global governance? Th is paper tries to answer this question by assessing the degree to which the G20's annual communiqués refl ect the policy preferences of the G20's developed and developing country members. Nine policy issues are selected in which developed and developing countries have expressed signifi cant diff erences of opinion in forums outside the G20. Th en, consensus on those issues is compared systematically across the G20, the G7, and the G24. Th e G7 and the G24 communiqués are used as proxies for the policy preferences of the developed and developing countries of the G20, respectively.
Abstract
To what extent has eight years of participation in the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (G20) strengthened the infl uence of developing countries in global governance? Th is paper tries to answer this question by assessing the degree to which the G20's annual communiqués refl ect the policy preferences of the G20's developed and developing country members. Nine policy issues are selected in which developed and developing countries have expressed signifi cant diff erences of opinion in forums outside the G20. Th en, consensus on those issues is compared systematically across the G20, the G7, and the G24. Th e G7 and the G24 communiqués are used as proxies for the policy preferences of the developed and developing countries of the G20, respectively.
Th e results of this exercise suggest that the G20 has primarily served as a vehicle for mobilizing support for G7 policies, especially on issues about which the G7 governments cared most strongly. Endorsement by the G20 has given these G7-driven policies a broader base of legitimacy and support. At the same time, positions favored by developing countries-especially those that would have imposed large costs on G7 fi rms and governments-have made little headway in the group. Developing countries have become more active and assertive in the G20 as the network has matured, and in two instances they made original contributions to the global policy agenda. But so far, the benefi ts of these initiatives have been modest. After eight years, the G20 has done little to enhance developing-country infl uence. Yet, the paper also identifi es a several reasons why it may too early for developing countries to give up on the G20.
Th e G20 after eight years For many observers, the creation of the Group of 20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (G20) in 1999 marked a watershed in global governance. After decades in which the most important decisions in global fi nancial and monetary management had been the exclusive province of a small club of the three, fi ve, or at most seven richest nations, a ministerial-level network had emerged bringing together the world's most advanced economies and some of the largest developing countries.
1 Convened at the initiative of the United States and other industrialized countries, the network promised to be a powerful, yet inclusive forum for global economic management. For the most sanguine commentators, the emergence of the G20 heralded a new age of more inclusive economic governance.
After eight years of G20 meetings and communiqués, there is little consensus about what the G20 has actually meant for the voice of developing countries in global governance.
2 Some scholars have embraced the network with optimism, arguing that "…the creation of the G20 has at least established a key institutional mechanism by which emerging market economies are able to aff ect the way in which the global fi nancial system is governed."
3 Others have been less positive: "Th e G20 is severely fl awed…As at present constituted, it is unlikely to lead anywhere. Its very existence defl ects energies from more appropriate and hopeful processes and agendas." 4 Which of these views is right? Has the G20 made a real diff erence to the degree of voice and infl uence developing countries enjoy in global economic governance? Th e existing academic and policy literature has mostly described the G20 in the context of eff orts to build a new international fi nancial architecture, 5 tried to explain the network's genesis, 6 analyzed its impact in global governance, 7 or prescribed ways to reform the G20. 8 However, the infl uence of developing countries in the G20 has been neglected by scholars.
Th is piece takes a critical look at G20 from the perspective of an outsider looking in. 9 It tries to assess whether participation in the G20 network has enabled developing countries to exercise greater voice and infl uence in global economic governance. Th e paper does this by evaluating the degree to which the G20's annual communiqués refl ect the policy preferences of the G20's developed and developing country members. Nine policy issues are selected in which developed and developing countries have expressed signifi cant diff erences of opinion in forums outside the G20. Th en, consensus on those issues is compared systematically across the G20, the G7, and the G24. Th e G7 and the G24 communiqués are used s proxies for the policy preferences of the developed and developing countries of the G20, respectively. I use the term "developing countries" in this paper to refer to G20 members other than the G7 (United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, and Japan) and Australia. Th is includes lowincome India and middle-income Argentina, Brazil, China, South Africa, Turkey, Mexico, Indonesia, and Russia. Two high-income countries-Saudi Arabia and Korea-are also included in this category because they have tended to identify with other middle-income countries and because they face social and political problems more characteristic of middle-income countries than of mature economies.
Th e paper proceeds in three sections. First, I examine the political environment and the motives that gave birth to the G20 in 1999. I also describe the network's characteristics and institutional environment. Th en, I explore the degree of infl uence developing counties enjoy within the network by evaluating the degree to which G7 and G24 positions on nine key issues are refl ected in G20 communiqués. Finally, I draw some conclusions from this comparative exercise and discuss scenarios for the G20's future.
Th is paper is part of a collection-soon to be published as an edited volume by Oxford University Press-that examines the creation, evolution, and impact of eight inter-governmental networks constituted partly or entirely by developing countries.
10 Th e project was launched by the Global Economic Governance Programme at Oxford University, and its overarching goal is to assess how developing countries are faring in an increasingly "networked" global order-one in which economic decisions are increasingly made in informal networks, rather than in formal international organizations.
Why create the G20?
Th e G20 was a child of the Asian fi nancial crisis of 1997-98. 11 While some argued that the crisis was primarily caused by sudden capital outfl ows, it also became clear that the crisis had important domestic roots, such as weak banking sectors and risky private-sector borrowing practices. If unaddressed, these domestic vulnerabilities could magnify and propagate the impact of fi nancial crises, potentially destabilizing the regional and even global fi nancial system. Th ese domestic policy issues could not be adequately addressed by the G7 governments acting alone-they required the active participation of and "buy in" from the largest, systemically-signifi cant developing countries.
Th en question, then, became to engage developing countries on issues of global fi nancial governance. From the beginning, the G7-and particularly the US government-sought a structure that would disturb as little as possible the existing institutional architecture. Th erefore, the creation of new international organizations was quickly ruled out. In a June 1999 report to their heads of state, the G7 fi nance ministers explicitly rejected the creation of new international organizations and instead endorsed eff orts "to widen the ongoing dialogue on the international fi nancial system to a broader range of countries…"
12
Proposals for an Asian Monetary Fund were famously buried by strong US Treasury opposition.
Creating the G20 was not the only possible course of action. At least two existing institutions could have been used to "broaden the ongoing dialogue." Th e Bank for International Settlements (BIS)-the Basel-based "central bankers' bank" and forum for bank regulators-might have been expanded to include the new systemically-signifi cant middle-income countries. However, the addition of up to twelve developing countries to the BIS roster would have changed the character of the organization, whose board of directors has been controlled since the 1930s by half a dozen industrialized countries, while its committees report directly to the G10. 13 In addition, the institutional culture of the BIS is dominated by central bankers and bank regulators, not by the broader-vision fi nance ministries. Th e relatively narrow and technical focus of BIS committees would have been too constraining for the type of dialogue required.
Another alternative would have been the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) of the IMF.
14 Th e Committee is charged with advising the Fund's Board of Governors on matters concerning the management of the international fi nancial system. With a representation structure based on the constituency system of the executive boards of the IMF and World Bank, the 24-member IMFC was probably the other obvious alternative.
However, the US Treasury had misgivings. 15 Th e IMFC is not conducive to informal dialogue but lends itself to the reading of prepared, pre-negotiated statements. Also, IMF staff and management was seen as exercising too much control over the IMFC's agenda and communiqués, and the IMF as a whole was seen as under-representing Asia and over-representing Europe. Finally, the IMFC included a variety of countries beyond the handful of systemically-signifi cant economies the G7 was interested in engaging directly.
Soon, the need for a new forum-an inter-governmental network-became clear. Financial crises were to be prevented through enhanced surveillance undertaken jointly by the Bank and Fund, complemented by a loose structure of standard-setting bodies, fi nancial regulators, private-sector actors, and developed-and developing-country governments. Th e IMF would remain the lender of last resort. Th is structure would be loosely tied together by a network of government offi cials from the G7, systemicallysignifi cant countries, and the Bretton Woods institutions.
Th e next problem then became selecting the membership. Th e fi rst incarnation of the G20 was a network known as the G22, or the "Willard Group." Th is was very much an initiative of US President Bill Clinton and was announced in November 1997, while the Asian crisis was still unfolding. Th e group comprised fi nance ministers and central bank governors from the G7 and fi fteen other countries, not all of which were obviously systemically signifi cant. Not surprisingly, East Asian countries were heavily represented. 16 Th e network fi rst met in April 1998 to discuss the stability of the global fi nancial system, and its main contribution was three reports on issues related to the strengthening of the international fi nancial architecture. 17 In early 1999, the G22 was superseded by a more unwieldy incarnation, the G33, which supplemented the original G22 countries with a range of African and Middle Eastern countries and non-G7 European economies.
18 Th e G33's main achievement was to convene seminars on the international fi nancial architecture in Bonn and Washington in the spring of 1999.
Th e G33 was fi nally replaced by a more permanent grouping, the G20, which was offi cially created at the G7 Finance Ministers' meeting on September 26, 1999 . Th is would be a consensus-based, deliberative body, established as "a forum for informal dialogue" with the purpose of ensuring "broader participation in discussions on international fi nancial aff airs among countries whose size or strategic importance gives them a particularly crucial role in the global economy." 19 Canadian leadership was instrumental in the creation of the G20, and Canadian Finance Minister Paul Martin was appointed the network's fi rst chairman. 20 Membership in the G20 network was ultimately decided in negotiations between the US Treasury Secretary and the Canadian Minister of Finance. 21 In addition to the G7 countries plus Russia, the G20 included the continental economies of China, India, and Brazil, as well as the systemically-signifi cant economies of Mexico and Indonesia. Th e more debatable cases of Turkey, Australia, Korea, and Argentina, and South Africa were added after some bargaining. Saudi Arabia was added to ensure representation of the Arab world and because of its leading role in OPEC and signifi cant voting share in the Bretton Woods institutions. Also, the Managing Director of the IMF and the President of the World Bank were included in the network, as well as the president of the European Central Bank and the chairpersons of the IMFC and the Development Committee. Th e result of these negotiations was a highly diverse group in both political and economic terms. Included were mature multi-party democracies, several states transitioning to some form of democracy, a monarchy, and a Communist, one-party state. Th e network also contained a wide range of national income levels, with the United States at one end (GNI per capita of $43,000) to India at the other (GNI per capita of $730). Ideas about the appropriate role of the state in the economy also varied widely in the group, from the economic liberalism of the United States and United Kingdom to the highly interventionist states of China and, to a lesser extent, Korea and Brazil. In contrast to the G7, the G20 was far from a peer group of like-minded states.
On the other hand, a great strength of the G20 was the highly representative nature of its membership. As Table 1 shows, G20 members represent over 60 percent of the world's people and almost 60 percent of global exports, as well as nearly 80 percent of the world's economic output. Th ey also hold over 60 percent of the votes on the executive boards of both Bretton Woods institutions, giving them a legitimate basis to consider initiatives for reforming the IMF and World Bank. In addition, the developed countries of the G20 house the biggest international lending banks, while its developed-country members issue just under 60 percent of all developing-country international debt securities. In other words, the G20 was well equipped to discuss issues of fi nance, debt, and trade while ensuring that the major traders, creditors, and debtors, would be represented around the table.
Unlike other inter-governmental networks, the G20 would not be nested within an international organization. As the fi gure above shows, the G20 enjoyed direct institutional links with the Bretton Woods institutions (both are represented in the network) but no direct links to or infl uence over the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) 22 or the Basel regulators' networks.
Assessing developing-country infl uence in the G20
Having examined the G20's genesis and institutional environment, now we can turn our attention to the paper's central question: Has the G20 enhanced developing-country voice and infl uence in global economic governance, or is it better described as a vehicle for mobilizing emerging-economy support for a G7-driven policy agenda?
Several characteristics of the network aff ect the ability of the G20's developing countries to exert infl uence within the network. In theory, the G20's membership structure should benefi t developing countries. Middle-income countries or "emerging markets" outnumber the G7 and Australia by a margin of eleven to eight, if one puts Russia in the developing country camp (not an unreasonable assumption given that Russia's economic structure and policy dilemmas have more in common with those of other middle-income countries than with the G7 members). In addition, the exclu-sion of least-developed countries means that the G20 developing countries can avoid some of the damaging policy splits that divide middle-and low-income countries in other forums, such as the WTO and United Nations. Finally, the chair of the G20, fi rst held by a G7 country (Canada) for three consecutive ministerial meetings, now rotates regularly among the membership following a complex scheme. 23 Yet, other features of the network undermine developing-country infl uence. Since the G20 is a consensus-based forum for discussion rather than a voting-based, decision-making entity, the developing countries' numerical advantage does not necessarily translate into greater infl uence. In addition, the G7 countries have more resources at their central banks and fi nance ministries to devote to G20 matters and therefore enjoy an advantage in terms of shaping the agenda, conducting research, and developing positions. For example, Australia and Canada have taken the leadership in hosting G20 workshops and preparing position papers.
Another important factor is the existence of multiple points for G7 infl uence over the G20's agenda and workplan. Th e G7 wields enormous infl uence in the networks and organizations that surround the G20, particularly in the IMFC, the executive boards of the Bank and Fund, the BIS, and the FSF. Th is means that G20 must react and engage with issues and positions in a heavily G7-dominated institutional environment. Th e G7's infl uence is further enhanced by the fact that G7 fi nance ministers-by virtue of holding their own ministerial and head-of-state meetings before the G20 ministerial each year-are more likely than developing-country ministers to arrive with a common agenda and a set of well-articulated positions. Also, the G7 fi nance deputies meet six times a year and communicate via conference call regularly, compared with the G20's semiannual deputies' meetings.
Having considered some of the G20's structural characteristics, now we can ask how the group has functioned in practice for developing countries. When the preferences of the G7 and the G20 developing countries diff er on a certain issue, to what degree are latter able to qualify, moderate, or shift the view of the leading industrialized states? In other words, is the G20 a forum for real dialogue, persuasion, and mutual learning between advanced and developing economies, or does it act mainly as a vehicle for legitimizing the G7's policy preferences? Although the G20's internal documents and proceedings remain confi dential, it is possible to take a fi rst cut at this question by examining the public record.
My approach is to fi rst identify the preferences of the G7 and the G20's developing countries in key policy areas by looking at the positions the two groups have taken independently in forums other than the G20. Th e position of the G7 fi nance ministers, I take from the group's annual communiqués and the reports to their heads of government from 1999 to 2007. Th e positions of the G20 developing countries, I infer from the semi-annual communiqués and related documents of the G24 over the same period.
Established in 1971 to coordinate the positions of developing countries on international fi nancial issues, the G24 meets twice a year before the spring and annual meetings of the IMF and World Bank governors. Using G24 communiqués for this comparative exercise has three advantages. First, the G24 includes seven of the eleven "developing country" members of the G20 (China and Saudi Arabia are regular participants, even though they are not in the original membership), so the group's statements can provide us with a reasonable proxy for these countries' preferences. 24 Second, G24 meetings are highly attuned to the discussions at the G7, IMFC, and G20, so G24 communiqués address the same issues and debates as these other groupings. And third, the G24's broader developing-country membership can help us detect diff erences in the interests of the middle-income countries of the G20 and low-income countries.
After examining the G7 and G24 positions on key issues, I then compare them with the positions articulated in the G20's annual communiqués for the same years. (Appendix 1 shows the evolution of the G20 agenda.) If the G20's position is indistinguishable from the G7's on issues in which the G24 and the G7 disagree, we can conclude one of two things. Either the G7 is coaxing or coercing at least some of the membership of the G20 into agreement, or the split is within the G24 itself-the middle-income countries which sit on both networks may actually have more in common with their G7 counterparts than with low-income countries. If, on the other hand, we fi nd that the G20 position refl ects a compromise between the G7 and G24 view, or if the G20 position largely refl ects the G24's preferences, then this would suggest that the G20 really is a forum where developing countries really are infl uencing the views of the most powerful states.
For this comparative exercise, I look at nine issues of special relevance to developing countries, issues that have been discussed by all three country groupings. In all areas chosen, the G24 stance diff ered in some signifi cant respect with the G7 position. Th e areas selected were (1) capital account liberalization and capital controls, (2) the formulation and adoption of standards and codes, (3) developing-country representation in new international forums, (4) the formulation and implementation of anti-money-laundering measures and measures to combat the fi nancing of terrorism (AML-CFT), (5) IMF and World Bank conditionality, (6) reforming the governance of the Bretton Woods institutions, (7) rules and practices in international trade, (8) debt relief and poverty reduction, and (9) sovereign-debt restructuring. Th e full comparative exercise is detailed in Appendix 2.
Th is exercise allows us to sort G20 positions on the selected issues into four categories, depending on how they relate to their G7 counterparts. In the fi rst category, the G20 stance not only drops all significant G24 objections and embraces the G7 posture but also expands upon it. Th is "G7 plus" position adds to the original number of policy commitments, makes them more detailed, or provides mechanisms or timelines that might make them "harder" and more enforceable.
Issues in the second category are those in which the G20 dropped the G24's objections and endorsed the G7 position without adding new commitments or refi nements. Th e third category includes issues in which the G20 simply chose to remain substantively silent, making only a very general statement without siding with either the G7 or G24. Finally, issues that fall in the fourth category are those in which the G20 adopted elements of the G24 position, elements that do not appear in G7 communiqués. Table  2 shows the categorization of the nine selected issues. Th e most extreme example of the G20 adopting a G7 position in the area of measures to combat money laundering and the fi nancing of terrorism. Th e G20 not only endorsed the G7's position, but adopted a more detailed and extensive version of the G7's own "Action Plan to Combat the Financing of Terrorism." Th e "G20 Action Plan on Terrorist Financing" is three times as long as the G7 plan, and includes more and more detailed commitments in the areas of freezing terrorist assets, implementation of international standards, information sharing, technical assistance, and compliance and reporting. At the same time, the G24's concerns about the G7's Financial Action Task Force (FATF) framework were all dropped in the G20 communiqués, including concerns about the "non-voluntary" and "non-cooperative" ways in which FATF recommendations were applied to non-FATF members.
Th is outcome is not surprising, as the US government made AML-CFT measures a top national security priority and was prepared to pressure other countries into accepting and implementing them. Also, the G20's annual meeting in 2001 took place only weeks after the September 11 th attacks, in an environment that made it very diffi cult to challenge the US-proposed measures. Finally, the G7 countries had started developing an AML-CFT framework several years before 2001, so that by the time the terrorist attacks took place, there was already a set of detailed initiatives that could be tabled at the G20 in short order.
Endorsing the G7 position
Th ree issues fall into the second category, where the G20 communiqués endorsed the G7 position without additions or refi nements. Th e fi rst issue is standards and codes, where the lines between the G7 and the G24 were clearly drawn. Th e G7 wanted compliance with the new standards to be part of regular IMF surveillance under Article IV, and it wanted standards and codes incorporated into Fund conditionality. 25 Th e G24, on the other hand, argued that the scope of IMF surveillance should not be extended to include observance of standards and codes, and that such observance should not be a consideration in Fund conditionality. In addition, the G24 demanded that pressure to observe transparency standards also be put on hedge funds and other private fi nancial institutions; it also called for a more inclusive process for developing standards and codes, one that gave developing countries a greater voice.
Th e G20's position aligned solidly with the G7's. Th e G20 agreed that "IMF surveillance should be the principal mechanism for monitoring countries' progress in implementing standards and codes…" 26 G20 members committed to undertaking ROSCs and FSAPs-the joint IMF and World Bank surveillance programs created to monitor the observance of codes and standards. G24 calls for a more inclusive standard-setting process and for applying standards to hedge funds were dropped, and the G20 stayed silent on whether observance of standards and codes should be a consideration in the design of conditionality.
A second issue in this category is developing-country representation new forums. Th e G24 repeatedly voiced concerns about the lack of developing-country participation in the Financial Stability Forum and expressed alarm at the growing role of international forums in which developing countries had little voice, such as the BIS. Also, in its Caracas Declaration II, the G24 called for the creation of an international Task Force composed of both developed and developing countries to review a variety of issues, including conditionality, burden-sharing in post-crisis stabilization, surveillance, and "the increased representation and participation of developing countries in the decision making organs of the international community." 27 Yet, the G20 did not raise these concerns in its communiqués or endorse the creation of the Task Force. Instead, the G20 endorsed the work of the FSF and its affi liated bodies. Only in 2002 would it raise the issue of developing-country representation in existing organization, namely the World Bank and IMF.
Th ird is the case of debt relief. In its 2000 and 2002 communiqués, the G24 expressed "deep concern" about the under-funding of the HIPC Initiative and Trust Fund and the slow implementation of the debt relief initiative. 28 It also noted that the HIPC Initiative's funding arrangements shifted a disproportionate burden of the cost of the initiative on other developing countries. However, the G20 chose not to voice these concerns or to convey a sense of urgency about the funds shortage. Instead, it echoed the G7's call on counties to commit to a 100 percent reduction of ODA claims and eligible commercial claims. It also welcomed donors' commitments to increase aid.
Silence and neutrality
Th e third category of issues includes those in which the G20 preferred to sidestep a controversy by staying little about it and refusing to take sides. Th is was the case with IMF and World Bank conditionality. On this critical issue for developing countries, the G7 and G24 positions clashed, especially in 1999-2000. G7 documents from this period staked out specifi c policy areas where conditionality should remain in place, even though some of these areas that were not considered core competencies of the Bretton Woods institutions. Th ese included trade liberalization, the creation of non-discriminatory insolvency regimes, and the elimination of state-directed lending on non-commercial terms. 29 At the same time, the G24 was condemning the intrusiveness of conditionality and its expansion beyond the mandate of the Bretton Woods institutions. Th e group also called for streamlining conditionality.
Over time, the G7 and G24 found common ground in supporting IMF eff orts to review and streamline conditionality. By contrast, the G20 stayed out of this debate entirely, at least in public. G20 communiqués made no direct mention of conditionality, and the group's 2005 "Statement on Reforming the Bretton Woods Insitutions" contained only a very general declaration about the appropriate roles of the IMF and World Bank.
Another case in this category is capital account liberalization. Capital controls were an issue of considerable interest to the middle-income countries of the G20 (at least six of which suff ered a fi nancial crisis triggered by capital outfl ows between 1999 and 2005). In its June 1999 communiqué, the G7 discouraged in somewhat tortured language the use of capital controls, declaring that "controls on capital infl ows may be justifi ed for a transitional period, but more comprehensive controls carry costs and should not be a substitute for reform; controls on capital outfl ows carry greater long term costs, are not eff ective policy instruments, and should not be a substitute for reform, through they may be necessary in exceptional circumstances." 30 Instead of discouraging the use of capital controls, the G24 called for further analysis on the use and eff ectiveness of specifi c capital controls, especially those on derivatives trading.
Th e G20's communiqués made no mention of capital controls-they neither echoed the G7 stance discouraging most controls, nor did they affi rm the G24's call for further analysis. Th e G20 ministers limited themselves to a general and mostly uncontroversial statement-that capital account liberalization can be a good thing, as long as it is implemented carefully, with the right sequencing, with eff ective regulation and supervision, and supported by technical assistance.
Finally, on trade, the G7 and G24 communiqués were quite diverse and emphasized diff erent policies. Th e G7 called for more trade-related technical assistance, the incorporation of trade liberalization measures in Fund and Bank programs and operations, the reduction of trade-distorting support and subsidies, and increasing market access for developing countries, among other things. Th e G24 condemned protectionist measures in developed countries, called on stronger IMF surveillance on the trade practices of industrialized countries, urged the Bank and Fund to publicize the development impact of trade restrictions, and blamed industrialized countries for the failure of the Doha round.
Th e G20 did not take sides in this debate and instead opted for general language on the need to reduce trade-distorting support and export subsidies. It omitted the G24's calls for ending industrialized-country agricultural tariff s and subsidies and for intensifi ed IMF surveillance of industrialized-country trade policies. At the same time, it dropped G7 demands that trade liberalization be part of Bank and Fund programs. Th e G20 did diverge from the G7 by highlighting the need for special and diff erential treatment for developing countries.
Building on the G24 agenda
Th e fourth and fi nal category includes issues in which the G20 adopted and sometimes expanded on elements that were part of the G24's agenda (but not of the G7's). Two issues fall into this category. Th e fi rst is debt restructuring, where the G20 picked up on the G24's proposal for a voluntary code of conduct for sovereign debt restructuring that was agreed by both private creditors and sovereign issuers. Using its unique position as a forum that brought together the home countries of major private creditors and top issuers of sovereign bonds, the G20 played a pro-active role by actively encouraging and later endorsing the "Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets." Th is was a unique G20 contribution, as the G7 was simply not the right venue to endorse principles requiring the agreement of both creditor and debtor countries.
Th e other issue in which the G20 diverged from the G7's line and built on the G24 position was the reform of the Bretton Woods institutions. Since 2000, the G24 had been pushing for governance reform at the BWIs, including a more transparent process for the selection of the heads of the World Bank and IMF and streamlined formulas for calculating quotas and voting power at both institutions. Starting in 2005, the G20 took up that cause, echoing virtually all of the G24's concerns and proposals (the one exception was the G24's call for a formula using GDP in purchasing-power-adjusted terms). Th is pressure seems to have helped persuade the IMF and World Bank governors to approve an ad hoc quota increase for China, Mexico, Turkey, and Korea in September 2006. Th e G20's demands for reform went beyond the G7's more modest proposals, which focused on getting the BWIs to make more documents public and to establish an evaluation body at the IMF. Th e G7 did recognize in 2005 the need to "to review the Fund's governance and quotas to refl ect developments in the world economy," but the G20 was more detailed and insistent than the G7 in calling for major reform at the BWIs. 31 To summarize, in four of the nine issues studied, the G20 endorsed and elaborated on the G7's position (one case) and endorsed the G7's position with no elaboration (three cases). In three cases, the G20 remained silent or neutral on the issue, and only in two cases did the G20 incorporate and build on G24 concerns. In other words, the G7's position was refl ected in the G20 communiqués twice as frequently than the G24's, and in a third of the cases, countries exercised a "veto" that prevented the group from issuing anything more than a neutral statement.
Crucially, it should be noted that the distribution of burdens imposed on countries were not the same across issues. Th ose issues in which the G7 position prevailed over the G24's involved relatively high costs for developing countries, whether in the form of adaptation costs (as in the implementation of AML-CFT measures and standards and codes) or in terms of forgone resources (as in under-funded debt relief commitments). Th ose issues in which silence and neutrality predominated included those in which G7 consumers, fi rms, and governments would have had to bear much of the cost had the G24 position prevailed (as in the imposition of capital controls by emerging economies or the removal of tariff s and subsidies in agriculture).
And third, those issues in which the G24 position won the day promised modest benefi ts for developing countries but did not seriously challenge G7 interests. For example, the principles on debt restructuring promote and endorsed by the G20 were prepared with extensive input from the International Institute of Finance, which represents the interests of leading US fi nancial institutions. Also, the principles were consistent with the preferences of the US and UK governments, which favored a fl exible, case-by-case approach to debt restructurings. 32 In the case of BWI reform, the G20's pressure has so far led only to small ad hoc quota increases for four countries, a measure which has not meaningfully disturbed the balance of power in either institution. In short, the victories the G7 appears to have won at the G20 are not only more numerous-they have been of much greater consequence than those won by developing countries.
Two hypotheses
How can we account for this pattern of declarations in G20 communiqués? And what does it tell us about developing-country infl uence in the network? A conclusive explanation this would require a detailed study of the G20's internal dynamics and negotiations, which is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we can at least ponder two hypotheses.
Th e fi rst, mentioned before, is that the real split is within the G24, between the emerging-market economies and the rest of the developing world. If this hypothesis is correct, them the G24's quarrels with the G7 were primarily fueled by the group's poor countries, countries such as Ethiopia, Guatemala, and Sri Lanka. Meanwhile, the G20's developing countries-large "emerging markets" like China, India, or Brazil-did not have to be bullied or coaxed into agreement by the G7; they had already embraced that position freely, and this is why the G20's stance was in harmony with the G7's on key issues.
Th ere are grounds to be skeptical of this hypothesis. Th ere is no doubt that the large emerging economies have interests that diff er from those of least-developed countries. Yet, on most of the issues selected for this comparative exercise, those diff erences proved small, or at least, they were set aside for the sake of consensus at the G24. Indeed, the G24's objections to the G7 agenda seem to be coming from middleincome countries as much as from low-income countries. Th is becomes clear when examine the positions some of the G20's developing countries have taken at IMFC meetings.
For example, Brazil has charged at the IMFC that "exaggerated expansion of [IMF and World Bank] conditionality has become dysfunctional, detrimental to the Fund's eff ectiveness, and has made program implementation unnecessarily more complicated." 33 Chinese offi cials have declared in the same forum that on standards and codes "we favor voluntary participation as opposed to forced implementation..." 34 On anti-money laundering issues, China has also declared that "While the FATF is invited to participate in the assessments, it should forgo its 'name and shame' practice…Th e Fund/Bank-led assessments should not include aspects of law enforcement." 35 Also, India has openly advocated the use of GDP on a purchasing-power-parity basis in a revised formula for calculating IMF and World Bank quotas. 36 All of these positions are echoed, sometimes verbatim, in G24 communiqués. In short, the reason we often see convergence between the G7 and the G20 on key issues may not be because the G20's developing countries agree with everything their advanced-economy peers have to say.
An alternative hypothesis is that the non-G7 members of the G20 simply do not fi nd it worthwhile to expend much political capital in that forum, choosing instead to fi ght policy battles in formal institutional organs-such as the executive boards of the IMF and World Bank-where decisions have real implications. An central reality of the G20 is that an enormous wealth and power gap exists between the G7 countries (or, more accurately, the G3 or G5) and the rest of the countries sitting around the G20 table. For most developing-country offi cials, picking a fi ght with powerful G7 ministers on sensitive issues for the sake a more balanced G20 communiqué that few will read is simply not worth the political cost, particularly if they fear potential G7 retribution in other venues. Th us, there may be a "chilling eff ect" that biases the contents of G20 communiqués in the direction of the G7 position, particularly when G7 offi cials put their full weight behind a position, thereby raising the political cost to non-G7 members of opposing it.
Th is hypothesis is correct, then it would provide a better explanation of why G7 and G20 positions converged on certain issues in G20 communiqués but diverged elsewhere. Telling is the declaration of a US Treasury offi cial, who made the following remark in an interview, apparently in genuine puzzlement: "I don't understand. In the G20, the [developing country] governors had no problems with standards and codes. But then, in the executive board [of the IMF], they raised all kinds of problems. Th ere seems to be a disconnect between the governors and their executive directors." 37 Th ere may very well be method to this madness: the "disconnect" does not refl ect a breakdown of communication or bureaucratic insubordination. Rather, it may refl ect a deliberate choice by governments to fi ght policy battles only in forums where they can aff ord the political costs of fi ghting them.
A supporter of the G20 might still conclude that challenging the G7 in public is not what the G20 was created for, that its real value added is more subtle and unobservable from the outside. Th e real contribution of the network, this argument runs, is mutual learning and education, frank discussion (the depth and quality of which is not necessarily refl ected in the fi nal communiqués), and relationship-building among senior offi cials. Scholars may want to assess the value of these functions by surveying G20 of-fi cials. But eventually, the degree to which participants value participation the group will be refl ected in indicators that can be observed from the outside-the attendance numbers and the seniority of the offi cials sent to the meetings.
Finally, one important nuance is worth noting. Th e G20's dynamics have not remained static over time. Th e willingness of developing countries to challenge the G7 and to add new issues to the agenda appears to have grown over time. Developing countries were least active in the fi rst three years of the G20, when a G7 country hosted the G20 meetings and occupied the chair. Developing-country offi cials were probably muted during this period by a mix of awe at the opportunity to sit in such an intimate setting with the heavyweights and mistrust about the G7's motivations for creating the forum.
But over time, developing-country offi cials gave grown comfortable with the network and have learned how to make it work for them. Developing countries have started using their role as chairs to introduce into the agenda issues of special interest to them and to pursue initiatives they feel strong about, such as the governance reform in the Bretton Woods institutions. Whether this greater assertiveness by developing countries will translate into a distinctly alterative policy agenda in G20 communiqués remains to be seen.
Conclusion
Th is paper has examined the origins and output of the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors over its eight years in existence. It has tried to assess whether the network has enhanced the infl uence of its low-and middle-income countries in global governance. To do so, it analyzed the substance of the G20's public consensus on nine policy issues. Industrialized and developing countries expressed signifi cant diff erences of opinion on these issues in other forums, namely the G7 and the G24.
Using G24 communiqués as a proxy for the views of non-G7 members of the G20, I found that in four of the nine cases studied, the G20 endorsed without qualifi cation the G7 position. In another three cases, the G20 remained silent or neutral. Only in two of the nine cases did the G20 incorporate signifi cant elements of the G24's alternative agenda into its public declarations. Notably, the distribution of costs varied across issues. On those issues in which the G7 stance prevailed, the costs fell most heavily on developing countries, while the issues in which the G20 stayed neutral would have imposed the heavier costs on G7 fi rms and governments. Finally, the G24 viewpoint prevailed on issues that promised relatively modest benefi ts for developing countries without imposing signifi cant costs on the most powerful states.
Th e comparative exercise suggests that the G20 has primarily served as a vehicle for mobilizing support for G7 policies, especially on issues about which the G7 cared most strongly, such as measures to fi ght money laundering, combat the fi nancing of terrorism, and promote the adoption and implementation of standards and codes. Endorsement by the G20 has given these G7-driven policies a broader base of legitimacy and support. At the same time, positions favored by developing countries-especially those that would have imposed large costs on G7 fi rms and governments but could have produced large benefi ts for developing countries-have made no headway in the group. Developing countries have become more active and assertive in the G20 as the network has matured, and in two instances they made original contributions to the global policy agenda. But so far the benefi ts of these initiatives have been modest. In sum, after eight years, the G20 has little to enhance developing-country infl uence.
Th e future of the G20
In view of all this, should developing countries give up on the G20? Not quite yet. Politics inside the G20 network have proven to be dynamic, and participation in the group may yet help developing countries infl uence the global agenda on key issues. Whether the G20 becomes a more eff ective vehicle for developing-country infl uence, however, will depend on how the network evolves over the next phase of its history.
At present, the group has exhausted its initial mandate on fi nancial crisis prevention and resolution and is struggling to recapture its sense of purpose and direction. Th e G7 has lost much of the interest it initially had in the G20, and the developing countries that have chaired the group in recent years have been struggling to design agendas that are at once urgent, relevant to the whole membership, and tractable. Th us, the G20 has reached an important juncture.
Th ere are three possible scenarios for the next stage of the G20's evolution. One scenario is that G20 governors and ministers will continue to meet regularly, organizing seminars and producing occasional papers, exchanging country experiences, and producing uncontroversial and little-noted communiqués that mostly adhere to G7 declarations or remain neutral on controversial issues. Because the G20 is the only ministerial-level network that brings together the G7 and large emerging economies, its developingcountry members will continue to attend, if for no other reason than because they value the prestige of sitting at the same table with the great powers. In this scenario, the network will remain a largely weak vehicle for developing-country infl uence.
Th e second scenario, one much discussed these days, is that the G20 will give way to an "L20" or similar incarnation, a grouping that brings together advanced economies and large developing countries at the headof-state and head-of-government level. Th e path to an L20 is strewn with political landmines, and it is only likely to happen slowly, through the gradual augmentation of today's G7/8. If the L20 ever materializes, the G20 will have served a crucial role as stepping stone to a more inclusive form of global governance.
Th e third scenario is that the G20 will come of age. Th is is an optimistic possibility, but the G20's recent history suggests that it is not implausible. In this scenario, the non-G7 members of the network-emboldened by their growing weight in the global economy and led by China, India, and Brazil-begin to engage the G7 in a serious debate about key issues in global economic governance. With increasing frequency, they put issues on the G20 agenda that are not being discussed elsewhere, issues that would not be discussed otherwise, and issues extending well beyond the G20's traditionally narrow focus on fi nancial and monetary issues. G20 communiqués begin to refl ect a more substantive dialogue and to off er a genuine synthesis of developed-and developing-country prescriptions on global issues.
Over time, the network could become the central locus for meaningful, high-level debate on economic matters among the world's key players, one that would infl uence the agendas of other governments, networks, and institutions. Whether or not this scenario comes to pass will depend on whether the G7 comes to appreciate the value of such a debate, and whether the non-G7 countries fi nd it worthwhile to pursue it through a network such as the G20, rather than through formal international organizations. Increased attention to standards and codes as part of Fund surveillance is acceptable, but it must remain within the core competencies of the Fund and compliance should remain voluntary; compliance assessments should take into account countries' institutional capacities and level of development; TA should be provided (1998); participation of developing countries in development of standards and codes has been limited and a more inclusive process is needed; the scope of IMF surveillance should not be extended to cover the observance of standards and codes; transparency should apply to all players in the international fi nancial system, including highly-leveraged institutions (2000); observance of standards and codes should not be incorporated into program conditionality (2001) G20 ministers welcome the work of the BWIs and other bodies toward the establishment of standards and codes; more widespread implementation of these codes is desirable; members agree to undertake the completion of ROSCs and FSAPs (1999); G20 endorses FSF's recommendations and encourages continued work on incentives to foster implementation in a manner and at a pace that refl ects each country's unique development, reform priorities, and institutional structure; IMF surveillance should be the principal mechanism for monitoring countries' progress in implementing standards and codes; governments should be encouraged to participate in IMF-led assessment programs and conduct on-going self-assessments of progress in observance of standards; TA should be available to assist countries with implementation (2000)
Issue area G7 position G24 position G20 position
Developingcountry representation in new forums
Promoting fi nancial stability does not require new international organizations; the G7 will convene the Financial Stability Forum (FSF); it will initially be a G7 initiative only, but more national authorities will be invited to join over time; new mechanism for informal dialogue [G20] proposed to complement and reinforce the role of the governing bodies of the Bretton Woods institutions (1999) To have legitimacy and ownership, the choice of participants for the proposed forum [G20] should take into account the constituency structure of the Bretton Woods institutions and should not undermine their role; the creation of the FSF is welcomed, but there should be appropriate developing-country representation (1999); there is concern about the growing role taken played by international fora (other than the Bretton Woods institutions) where developing-country representation is limited (2000) No explicit references to new forums and institutions; endorsement of the work of the FSF (2000).
AML/CFT
Support the eff orts of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF); urge it to identify countries and territories that fail to cooperate in the fi ght against money laundering, consult with them, and if consultations are not productive, recommend action designed to convince them to modify their laws and practices (1999); encourage non-cooperative jurisdictions to demonstrate their willingness and ability to implement reforms so they can be de-listed from the non-cooperative countries list at earliest possible time; G7 Action Plan to Combat Financing of Terrorism prepared (2001) Anti-money laundering should be a cooperative venture between developed and developing countries; should include large fi nancial centers as well as off -shore centers; there is concern about non-cooperative and non-voluntary manner in which FATF recommendations are being applied to non-members; application of standards should take into account countries' capabilities and level of development; IMF should not become involved in law enforcement (2001) 
